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I.

INTRODUCTION

Serious short- and long-term consequences can ensue for the
United States, other countries, U.S. and other military and
intelligence agency personnel, and other U.S. nationals with
respect to violations of the laws of war' that are not merely

t
Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 178,
499 (1956) ("The term 'war crimes' is the technical expression for a violation of
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systematic and widespread, but also an admitted part of a "common
plan" or "program" of the Bush administration in response to
terrorism.2 As noted previously,
the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the
law of war is a war crime.").
2. Concerning the admitted program and common plan, see, e.g., JORDANJ.
PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE
"WAR" ON TERROR 1, 5, 9, 12, 14, 17-19, 23-24, 30, 45-46 (2007); Jan Crawford

Greenburg et al., Bush Aware of Advisers' Interrogation Talks, ABC NEWS, Apr. 11,
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/politics/wirestory?id=4635175 (An "inner circle"
composed of the National Security Council's Principals Committee conducted
meetings in the White House situation room to approve various specific coercive
interrogation tactics, including waterboarding. The meetings were attended by
Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Ashcroft, and others. "[T]he most senior Bush
administration officials repeatedly discussed and approved specific details,"
"meetings ...were typically attended by most of the principals or their deputies,"
and "[s]ources said that at each discussion, all the Principals present approved...
."). See a/soJOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 30-31 (2006) (starting in December
2001, "senior lawyers from the attorney general's office, the White House
counsel's office, the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSC met ....
This group of lawyers would meet repeatedly over the next months to develop
policy of the war on terrorism. We certainly did not all agree .... Meetings were
usually chaired by Alberto Gonzales . . . . At meetings, his deputy, Timothy

Flanigan, usually played the role of inquisitor .. ");id. at 32-33 (William Howard
Taft IV, John Bellinger, Jim Haynes, and David Addington were often at the
meetings, and "Bellinger often shared Taft's accommodating attitude toward
international law .. ");id. at 39 ("[I]n mid-January 2002," "the lawyers met again
in the White House situation room . .

.

. Consensus eluded the group[,]" but

Gonzales would later summarize the positions for the President); Barton Gellman
&Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at A01,
available
at
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/chapterjl/
(describing the general roles of Cheney, Addington, Flanigan, and Gonzales in
denying Geneva law protections to detainees); Jan Crawford Greenburg et al.,
Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved "Enhanced Interrogation," ABC NEWS, Apr. 9,
2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4583256&page=l;
Lara Jakes Jordan & Pamela Hess, Cheney, Others OK'd Harsh Interrogations, AP
NEWS, Apr. 11, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/politics/wirestory?id=4631535; Lara
Jakes Jordan, Cheney Led Approvals of Harsh Interrogations,STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Apr. 11, 2008, at 1; DeirdreJurand, Ashcroft Involved with Torture Memos: Bush
Administration
Lawyers,
JURIST,
June
27,
2008,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/06/ashcroft-involved-with-torturememos.php; Matthew Lee, Rice Defends Post 9/11 Torture, AP NEWS, May 23, 2008,
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/05/23/9144; Mark Mazzetti, Bush
Aids Tied to Talks on CIA Interrogations, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/25/america/cia.php
(adding that John
Bellinger has stated that John Yoo issued oral guidance to the CIA during such
meetings); Greg Miller, Cheney Says He Had Key Role in InterrogationMethods, BALT.
SUN,
Dec.
16,
2008,
at
14A,
available
at
http://wwwv.baltimoresun.com/news/nation/politics/balte.cheneyl6decl6,0,110697.story (Cheney said he was "directly involved in
approving severe interrogation methods," including waterboarding. Cheney also
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there are short- and long-term consequences of
illegality. For example, war crimes policies and
authorizations are not merely a threat to
constitutional government and our democracy.
They threaten law and order more generally, violate
our common dignity, degrade our military, place
our soldiers and CIA personnel in harm's way,
thwart our mission, and deflate our authority and
influence abroad. They can embolden an enemy,
serve as a terrorist recruitment tool, lengthen social
violence, and fulfill other terrorist ambitions.3

said he was "aware of the program, certainly, and involved in helping get the
process cleared." When asked whether he still believes it was appropriate to use
waterboarding, Cheney responded, "I do."); Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al (Attorney General
Gonzales approved a memo written by Steven G. Bradbury justifying coercive CIA
tactics, including "simulated drowning and frigid temperatures."); Joby Warrick,
Top Officials Knew in 2002 of Harsh Interrogations,WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2008, at A7.
In written responses on September 12, 2008 to questions from Senator
Carl Levin, Secretary Rice stated that the "CIA's program was ... reviewed by the
NSC Principals"; she "was present in meetings at which DOJ lawyers provided legal
advice about the CIA program"; she knew that 'John Yoo provided advice at
several of these meetings"; she "asked the Attorney General personally to review
the legal guidance prepared by OLC [DOJ]"; she understood that DOJ "was
providing advice to CIA, and that this advice was being coordinated by Counsel to
the President Alberto Gonzales"; and her legal adviser John Bellinger "advised me
on a regular basis regarding concerns and issues relating to DOD detention
policies and practices at Guantanamo." Authorization of Survival Evasion Resistance
and Escape (SERE) Techniques for Interrogationsin Iraq: Part II of the Committee's Inqui7y
into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 110th
Cong. TAB 3, at 3-5, 7 (2008) (written responses of Condoleezza Rice, U.S.
Secretary of State, in opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin), available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/SASC.doctments.092508.p
df. Written responses of John Bellinger to Senator Levin stated that "a number of
individuals who were present at meetings I attended on the CIA program, or the
legal guidance thereon, asked questions or expressed concerns about these issues.
...
I was present at several meetings at which OLC attorneys provided oral advice
regarding interrogation techniques proposed to be used by CIA .... I recall that..
. John Yoo provided legal guidance in some of the meetings. . . . I raised . . .
concerns [upon hearing about tactics used at Gitmo] on several occasions with
DOD officials and was told that the allegations were being investigated by the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service." Id. TAB 4, at 3-5, 8. Senator Levin's
statement
is
also
available
at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=303575.
3. PAUST, supra note 2, at 98-99 (citing Geoffrey S. Corn, Pentagon Process
Subverted? The Lost Battle of Alberto Mora, JURIST,
Feb. 22,
2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/pentagon-process-subverted-lostbattle.php).
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It is the purpose of this essay to more fully articulate the types
of detrimental consequences that can arise from these and other
unlawful responses to terrorism. For several reasons, it is evident
that our Nation's security is not well-served by a lawless executive. 4

II. PLACING OUR PEOPLE IN HARM'S WAY
A.

CriminalLiability

The Bush program of manifestly unlawful transfer, detention,
and interrogation has subjected various members of the executive
branch, including U.S. military and CIA personnel, to possible
criminal prosecution here and in foreign courts exercising
territorial5 or universal6 jurisdiction, future ad hoc international
criminal tribunals, and, in some circumstances, the International
Criminal Court (ICC). 7 With respect to war crimes, it is important
4. See alsoJustice Wilson's warning in 1791 that "[n]o one should be secure
while he violates the Constitution and the laws," quoted in JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 497 n.2 (2d ed. 2003).
5. Under international law, states have jurisdictional competence to
prosecute or allow civil suits against persons who engage in illegal conduct in their
territory. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 4, at 416-19; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our
InternationalConstitution, 31 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 93 n.643 (2006) (citing Cunard S.S.
Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923)) ("[The definition of territorial
jurisdiction] now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere .... ").
6. Under international law, all states have jurisdictional competence to
address a violation of customary international law wherever it has occurred and
whoever has committed it. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 4, at 420-23; Christopher
Hale, Does the Evolution of International CriminalLaw End with the ICC? The "Roaming
ICC"*A Model International Criminal Court for a State-Centric World of International
Law, 35 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 429, 432-33 (2007) (defining universal
jurisdiction as "a principle of law that enables and/or requires a State to exercise
jurisdiction over specific crimes without a connection between the offense,
offender, or victim and the State exercising jurisdiction"). Various international
criminal law treaties also provide a type of universal jurisdictional competence by
consent among the parties to a treaty that can reach the nationals of a party. See,
e.g., PAUST, supranote 4, at 423.

7. Concerning possible jurisdiction of the ICC over U.S. nationals, see, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICCJurisdictionover Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1-15 (2000). ICCjurisdiction is possible when a crime within the
Statute of the ICC has been committed within the territory of a party to the treaty
and that state or any other party transfers the accused to the Court. See Statute of
the International Criminal Court arts. 12(2)(a), 13(a), 13(c), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
Afghanistan is a party to the treaty, and so are the following: Albania, Bulgaria,
Jordan, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom-which controls Diego Garcia
as a British overseas territory in the Indian Ocean, where secret detention and

interrogation sites were suspected. See also PAUST, supra note 2, at 152-53 n.96;
Elaine Ganley, Prober: CIA Ran Secret Jails in Europe, WASH. POST, June 8, 2007,
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to note that every relevant federal and state court decision and
dicta since the dawn of the United States has recognized that the
President and all persons within the executive branch are bound by
the laws of war.'
Four general types of criminal responsibility can exist under
international law. First, it is obvious that direct perpetrators of
violations of the laws of war, the Convention Against Torture, and
crimes against humanity (such as forced disappearance of persons
as part of the President's "program" of secret detention) have
direct liability. Leaders who issue orders or authorizations to
commit international crimes can also be prosecuted as direct
perpetrators.
Second, any person who aids and abets an international crime
is liable as a complicitor or aider and abettor before the fact,
during the fact, or after the fact.'" Liability exists irrespective of
whether the person knows that his or her conduct is criminal.
Under customary international law, a complicitor or aider and
abettor need only be aware that his or her conduct would or Sdoes
. 12
assist a direct perpetrator or facilitates conduct that is criminal.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/6/8/AR2007060801224.html?tid=informbox;
Bernard Hibbitts, UK Commons Committee Deplores "False" US Assurances on Diego
Garcia
Renditions,
JURIST,
July
6,
2008,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/07/uk-commons-committee-deploresfalse-us.php. Forjurisdictional purposes, crimes committed by direct perpetrators
can be attributed to those who authorize, order, or aid and abet from the United
States as if they acted within such countries. See generally PAUST, supra note 4, at
417-19.
8. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 20-22, 169-72 nn.188-195; Jordan J.
Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary
Concerningthe Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C. DAvIsJ. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 205, 240-42 & n.135 (2008).
9. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 32, 35, 51-73 (3d ed. 2007); see also Greg R. Vetter, Command
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court, 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 89, 97 (2000) ("The [command responsibility] doctrine can create a
direct criminal liability, as in the case where a leader orders a subordinate to
commit a crime, and the doctrine can create imputed criminal responsibility when
a leader fails to exercise sufficient diligence in monitoring and controlling his or
her subordinates.").
10. See, e.g., PAUST, BAssIOUNI ET AL., supra note 9, at 32, 35, 44-49 (citing
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-T, Trial Chamber, 1 545 (Sept. 2, 1998));
PAUST, supra note 2, at 18, 24, 30, 165, 167, 185, 193, 199, 277.
11. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 25(3)(c)-(d), 30,
32(2), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
12. See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y.
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In any case, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Especially relevant
in this respect are the criminal memoranda and behavior of various
German lawyers in the German Ministry of Justice, high-level
executive positions outside the Ministry, and the courts in the
1930s and 1940s that were addressed in informing detail in United
States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case).' 3 Clearly, several memo
writers and others in the Bush administration abetted the
"common, unifying" plan and their memos substantially facilitated
its effectuation.
Third, individuals can also be prosecuted for participation in a
'Joint criminal enterprise,"" which the International Criminal
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has recognized can exist in at least
two relevant forms: (1) where all the accused "voluntarily
participate in one aspect of a common plan" and "intend the
criminal result [whether or not they knew it was a crime], even if
not physically perpetrating the crime";'5 and (2) where "(i) the
crime charged is the natural and foreseeable consequence of the
execution of that enterprise, and (ii) the accused was aware that
such a crime was a possible consequence of the execution of that
enterprise, and, with that awareness participated in that
enterprise." 6
Fourth, civilian and military leaders with either de facto or de
jure authority can also be liable for dereliction of duty with respect
to acts of subordinates when: (1) the leader knew or should have
known that subordinates were about to commit, were committing,
or had committed international crimes; (2) the leader had an
opportunity to act; and (3) the leader failed to take reasonable
corrective action, such as ordering a halt to criminal activity or

2007); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, Appeals Chamber, 50 (July
29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. ICTY-95-17/1, Trial Chamber,
236-38, 245, 249 (Dec. 10, 1998); supra note 10. But see Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (adding a new
"purpose" to facilitate a test that will leave ICCjurisdiction incomplete).
13. See United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL

LAW No. 10, 1058 (1951).
14. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., supra note 9, at 32, 37-38; see also

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
185-229
(July 15, 1999).
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, 264 (Sept. 1, 2004).
16. Id. 265; see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, Appeals
Chamber, 50 (July 29, 2004).
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initiating a process for prosecution
of all subordinates reasonably
7
1
accused of criminal conduct.
B.

Civil Liability

Civil liability for participation in unlawful responses to
terrorism, including unlawful measures of interrogation, is also
possible. Civil actions might be brought here or abroad by the
direct victims of illegal conduct and possibly by indirect victims
such as family members
of those who have suffered from illegal
18
interrogation tactics.
C. Mental Harm and Impacts on Well-Being
Persons who engage in illegal interrogation tactics and other
unlawful treatment of human beings can suffer mental and even
physical stress and other bodily harm both during and after the
person engages in such conduct.' 9 Such consequences are
sometimes ignored by governmental elites who place our people in
harm's way when authorizing unlawful programs of detention and
treatment, but short- and long-term mental and physical harm
should be recognized as foreseeable outcomes of illegality when
making policy choices. Furthermore, they should be recognized
after they occur so that persons who suffer from post-traumatic
stress and related symptoms obtain needed medical and
psychological treatment and rehabilitation. While untreated, such
persons might cause harm to others in our community, including
their family members. More generally, effectuation of a program
or common plan of unlawful interrogation of other human beings
resulting, for example, in torture, cruel treatment, or inhumane
17. See, e.g., PAUST, BAssioUNI ET AL., supra note 9, at 51-73; PAUST, supra note
2, at 18-19, 153, 202, 220, 261; see alsoJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765,
789 (1950) (no public official immunity exists for war crimes); Prosecutor v.
Milosevic, Case No. ICTY-99-37-PT, 1 26-34 (Nov. 8, 2001) (nonimmunity of
heads of state reflected in Article 7 of the Statute of the ICTY "reflects a rule of
customary international law").
18. See generally PAUST, supra note 2, at 18, 23, 31, 71-72, 165-67 nn.154-155,

293 n.152 (citing General Comment No. 7, 1, Report of the H.R. Comm., 37
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), Annex V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963
(1982)).
19.
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation,66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Edgardo Rotman, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Terrorism, 30 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 525, 542 (2008) (torture is "largely ineffective" and has "negative
psychological effects" for the perpetrators).
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treatment of detained persons can have a dehumanizing impact on
large numbers of participants in such forms of interrogation and
detrimentally impact larger numbers of others. An indirect
consequence can involve the creation of a generation of guilt,
especially among those who knew what was happening and did not
care to oppose an admitted program of inhumane treatment of
other human beings. 2
D. Denial of POW Status and Combatant Immunity
The Bush administration's denial of prisoner-of-war status to
members of the regular armed forces of the Taliban who were
captured during the international armed conflict in Afghanistan
that began in October 2001 is a violation of Article 4(A) (1) and/or
(3) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War 21 that can produce dire consequences for U.S. and
other military personnel if such a denial is repeated in other armed
conflicts. 2 2

The

concomitant

denial

of combatant status to

members of the regular armed forces of the Taliban and the denial
of combatant immunity for lawful acts of warfare is a violation of
the customary laws of war that are of central importance to U.S.
and other military personnel. 2' The Military Commissions Act of
in ways
200624 attempted to perpetuate these violations, Ssometimes
25
that were not only dangerous but also nonsensical. Each violation
of the laws of war is a war crime that can result in criminal and civil
responsibility. Additional war crime responsibility results when
these and other rights to status and treatment are "declare[d]

20. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture under the Bush
Administration,37 CASE W. REs.J. INT'LL. 389, 418-19, 424 (2006).
21.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,

Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 56-

57.
22. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 57-58.
23. See, e.g., id. at 50-56 (citing Robert K. Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore,
Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights
Under International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 6 (2002),
http://www.asil/taskforce/goldman.pdf).
24. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948).
25. See, e.g., PAL'ST, supra note 2, at 58-62, 207 n.40 (citing § 948a(1) (A) (i),

120 Stat. at 2601) (identifying the first type of "unlawful enemy combatant" as "a
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda,
or associated forces)").
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abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law."'2 6
III.

A.

MISSION FAILURE

Unlawful InterrogationCan ProduceFaulty Intelligence

Unlawful interrogation tactics can produce faulty intelligence
and other deleterious consequences. In response to the Bush
program of coercive interrogation and before a vote by the House
of Representatives to approve the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
former CIA Director Stansfield Turner and thirty-two retired CIA
and other professional intelligence and interrogation experts wrote
a letter to Senator McCain expressing their "strong support" for the
McCain amendment "reinforcing the ban on cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment by all US personnel around the world." 2' The
letter also declared that "use of torture and other cruelty against
those in US custody undermines" U.S. efforts to combat terrorist
violence and that "[s]uch tactics fail to produce reliable
information, risk corrupting the institutions that employ them, and
cause.
forfeit the ideals that attract others to our nation's
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
26. See, e.g.,
War on Land, Annex, art. 23(h), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; PAUST,
supra note 2, at 19, 257-58 n.105, 265-66 n.12.
27. Letter from Stansfield Turner et al. to John S. McCain, U.S. Senator (Dec.
at
available
2005),
9,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005alerts/etn-1209-ciamccain.htm.
28. Id.; The Origins of Aggressive Interrogations Techniques Before the S. Armed Servs.
Comm., I 10th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Origins] (statement of Sen. Carl Levin),
availableat http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/reease.cfm?id=299242 ("[A] senior
intelligence officer . . . told me that treating detainees harshly is actually an
impediment-a 'roadblock' to use that officer's word-to getting intelligence.");
Origins, supra at 8 (Criminal Investigative Task Force at Gitmo and FBI personnel
"said the use of aggressive techniques only 'ends up fueling hostility and
See also Christopher C. Joyner,
strengthening a detainee's will to resist."').
Terrorizing the Terrorists:An Essay on the Permissibility of Torture, in THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: EssAYs IN HONOR OF M. CHERIF
BAssIOUNI 227, 244, 247-48 (Leila Nadya Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2008)
[hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE]; Bassiouni, supra note 20, at 424; Jeannine
Bell, "Behind This Mortal Bone". The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339

(2008); O'Connell, supra note 19, at 1257-63; Rotman, supra note 19, at 542
(noting that torture and other cruelty is "largely ineffective" and creates
"untrustworthy confessions"); Leila Nadya Sadat, Shattering the Nuremberg Consensus:
US. Rendition Policy and International Criminal Law, 3 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 65, 72
(2008) [hereinafter Sadat, Nuremberg]; Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition,
Toture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200,
1245 & n.219 (2007) [hereinafter Sadat, Nightmares] (stating that unlawful tactics
generally have not produced effective intelligence and the lessening of terrorist
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B. Inhibition of CooperativePrevention and Responses
1. Sharing of Intelligence
The sharing of intelligence is often critical to the effective
prevention and defeat of terrorism. It is significant, therefore, that
unlawful forms of detention and interrogation of suspected
terrorists and other detainees can spawn a lack of trust and refusals
by foreign states to share intelligence with a state that engages in
unlawful behavior. 29 Foreign intelligence agencies might be
reluctant to fully participate because of possible international
criminal liability for personnel who become complicit in
international criminal conduct involving illegal rendition,
detention, interrogation, and other treatment of detainees.
Reluctance might also exist because of the possibility of domestic
and foreign discovery of complicit involvement in an
internationally criminal program and consequential state
responsibility (leading to various types of sanctions against the
state), deflation of authority and respect, and detrimental domestic
political and foreign policy outcomes.
More generally, Justice Kennedy has remarked: "Security
depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability
of our military to act and to interdict .... Security subsists, too, in

fidelity to freedom's first principles.""
2.

CooperativeApprehension of Accused and Prosecution

For similar reasons, a governmental program of unlawful
rendition, detention, treatment, and prosecution can also inhibit
cooperative efforts to capture, arrest, and render alleged terrorists
to other countries for prosecution.3 Such a program can also be
violence). Colin Powell stated before the U.N. Security Council on February 5,
2003, that he "can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq
provided training in" weapons of mass destruction to members of al Qaeda. In
January 2004, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi stated that the information sent to Powell was
false and that he said anything to avoid the torture that he had experienced. See,
e.g., Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the
Legality of "Rendition,"20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 248-50 & nn.299-302 (2006).
29. See also Mark A. Drumbl, "Lesser Evils" in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 335, 347-48 (2004) (refusal of domestic persons to share
intelligence); Alberto J. Mora, Remarks, A Hartman Hotz Symposium: Intelligence,
Law, and Democracy, 60 ARK. L. REV. 809, 820, 822-23 (2008).
30. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
31. See, e.g., Mora, supra note 29, at 822-23; Sadat, Nightmares, supra note 28,
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detrimental for the assurance of cooperative criminal investigation
and mutual legal assistance for prosecution in the form of
cooperative exchanges of evidence, expert testimony, and
availability of other witnesses. Why would a state and its nationals
risk liability for aiding and abetting such a criminal governmental
program of another state?
In 1991, the U.N. General Assembly made an oblique
reference to possible consequences of "acts of terrorism" with
respect to international cooperation when deploring "the
pernicious impact of these acts on relations of cooperation among
States." 12 These consequences can also pertain when the state that
is responding to non-state actor terrorism uses terroristic forms of
interrogation of suspected terrorists, such as threatening to kill
family members, using dogs for terroristic purposes, and using
waterboarding to instill an intense fear of drowning.
3.

Extradition

A program of unlawful rendition, detention, interrogation,
and prosecution can also result in a refusal by some states to
extradite persons who are reasonably accused of having committed
acts of terrorism to a country that has adopted such a program. It
has been reported that this was the case with the Bush
administration's program of coercive interrogation and executivecreated military commissions that would deny basic laws of war and
human rights to due process. For example, Spain indicated that it
would not extradite eight persons suspected of complicity in the
September 11 attacks on the United States unless the Bush
administration promised that they would not be tried in a Bush
military commission.3 3 One news report added that "[a] senior
European Union official . . . doubted that any of the 15 [EU]
nations... would agree to extradition that involved the possibility
of a military trial. ''" 4 At one point, "Britain and France warned they
might not turn over Taliban and [a]l Qaeda fighters captured by
their troops in Afghanistan unless Mr. Bush pledged to honor" the
Geneva Conventions.35
at 1247.
32. See G.A. Res. 46/51, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (Dec. 9, 1991).
33. See, e.g., Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The
Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdlefor Extraditions,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al.
34. Id.
35. See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives;
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In fact, states have an absolute duty under treaty-based and
customary international law to not extradite or render a person to
another country where there is a real risk that the person will suffer
human rights violations in the country or where there are
substantial grounds for believing that the person will be
persecuted, for example, because of that person's religion, race,
national origin, or political opinion. 36 Furthermore, the U.S.
program of rendition to other countries for secret detention and
unlawful interrogation has been criticized for violating such
international legal obligations.3 7
C. Degradationof OurMilitary
Degradation of our military through a program of unlawful
responses to terrorism can include moral and psychological
degradation
and
detrimental
impacts
upon
military
professionalism, honor and integrity, morale, retention, and
recruitment.
This in turn can degrade mission readiness and
performance. Participation in coercive interrogation in violation of
the laws of war and human rights can also foster lack of respect for
fellow human beings and the rule of law, which can lead to further
illegality that impacts detrimentally on the overall mission.
Ultimately, a strong and effective military that serves the national
interest in a constitutional democracy is one that operates within
the law.
D. DegradationofInter-Agency Cooperation
Unlawful responses to terrorism by some members of the
Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at Al2.
36. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 475 cmt. g, 476 cmt. h, 711 reporter's note 7 (1987); PAUST,
supra note 2, at 35, 106, 163, 193 n.76, 187 n.43, 188 n.45, 200 n.145; PAUST,
BASSIOUNI ETAL., supra note 9, at 344-45, 348-53, 396, 401.
37. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 18, 26, 32, 34-35, 41, 45-46, 152-53 n.96,
178 n.15, 187 n.43, 188 n.45, 200 n.145; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret
History of America's "ExtraordinaryRendition" Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14,
2005, at 106.
38. See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Hadithaand My Lai: Lessons from the Law of
War, JURIST, June 2, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/06/hadithaand-my-lai-lessons-from-law-of.php; Geoffrey S. Corn, For the Sake of Warriors:
Accepting the Limits of the Law of War, JURIST,
Feb. 9, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/for-sake-of-warriors-acceptinglimits.php;Joyner, supra note 28, at 238 n.43, 240 & n.49.
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executive branch can foster a lack of respect among executive
agencies and lead to a lack of effective cooperation, 39 especially if
cooperation is thought to contribute to illegal programs and plans
and such contributions can lead to criminal and civil sanctions
against those who are complicit in international crimes.
E.

Contributionto the Causes of Terrorism

In 2006, the U.N. General Assembly announced a Plan of
Action as part of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism
40
Strategy.
The Plan of Action expressly recognized that
"conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism" can include
"dehumanization of victims of terrorism[,] . . .lack of the rule of
law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious
discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization
and lack of good governance, while recognizing that none of these
conditions can excuse or justify acts of terrorism." 41 Some of the
conditions, of course, could be created or exacerbated by war
crimes and other violations of international law perpetrated in
response to acts of terrorism. This is undoubtedly why the Plan of
Action reaffirmed "that the promotion and protection of human
rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of
the Strategy" and recognized "that effective counter-terrorism
measures and the protection of human rights are
complementary and mutually reinforcing. 42 Later in 2006, the
General Assembly also recognized that "respect for human rights
for all, international humanitarian law and the rule of law" can
help to defeat terrorism while affirming that such respect for
human rights and law is "the fundamental basis for the fight against
terrorism. 4 3 Implicit in such an affirmation is the recognition that
39. See also Geoffrey S. Corn, Pentagon Process Subverted? The Lost Battle of Alberto
Mora,JuRisT, Feb. 22, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/pentagonprocess-subverted-lost-battle.php (addressing the subversion of normal executive
branch decision making by those anxious to avoid the law).
40. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res.
60/288, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy].
41. Id. at Annex, pt. I.; see also G.A. Res. 46/51, supra note 32,
6 ("causes
underlying international terrorism [can include] situations involving mass and
flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms").
42. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, supranote 40, at Annex, pt. IV; see also
Rotman, supra note 19, at 543-47 (identifying the therapeutic significance of legal
responses to terrorism).
43. See Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
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violations of human rights, humanitarian law, and the rule of law
can exacerbate the fight against terrorism. It is assuredly one of
the reasons why the General Assembly has consistently declared
that "[s]tates must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with their obligations under international law,
in particular international human rights, refugee and
humanitarian law, 44 and has reaffirmed "that it is imperative that all
States work to uphold and protect the dignity of individuals and
their fundamental freedoms, as well as democratic
practices and
4
the rule of law, while countering terrorism. 5
TV. AID TO THE ENEMY
A.

Rallying the Enemy

A serial war crimes governmental policy can serve terrorist
ambitions in several ways. As noted in a prior writing, the common
plan of the Bush administration to use unlawful coercive
interrogation undoubtedly contributed to increased violence in
Afghanistan and Iraq, inspired the enemy to greater violence, and
served as a terrorist recruitment tool. 46 This can lengthen and
intensify violence, influence barbarity, and create a generation of
violence in alleged revenge." Some terrorist groups count on
Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/171
(Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Protection of Human Rights] ("Reiterating the
important contribution of measures taken at all levels against terrorism, consistent
with international law, in particular international human rights law and refugee
and humanitarian law, to the functioning of democratic institutions and the
maintenance of peace and security ...[and] [r]ecognizing that the respect for all
human rights, the respect for democracy and the respect for the rule of law are
interrelated and mutually reinforcing.").
44. Id. 1.

45.

Id. 9.

46. PAUST, supra note 2, at 46; see also Origins, supra note 28, at 1 ("The abuse
at Abu Ghraib was a potent recruiting tool for al Qaeda and handed al Qaeda a
propaganda weapon they could use to peddle their violent ideology."); Drumbl,
supra note 29, at 347, 347 n.46 (addressing the risk of feeding violence); Editorial,
The Torture Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A42 ("Alberto Mora ... told the
Senate Committee that 'there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that
the first and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq-as judged
by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat-are,
respectively, the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.").
47. See also Bassiouni, supra note 20, at 424 ("each person tortured, as well as
his/her family, are likely to become enemies of the U.S. and seek revenge for their
treatment, thus generating more potential enemies likely to threaten the security
of this country and its people"); Rotman, supranote 19, at 538-47.
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governmental overreaction and criminal behavior in an attempt to
deconstruct the impermissibility of their own behavior and
demonstrate the unlawful and immoral nature of a government.
War crime responses to terror can play into their hands.
B.

Unwitting Support of Enemy Status and Methods

Lawless overreaction on the part of governments can serve
terrorist ambitions by contributing to the deconstruction of the
impermissibility of terrorist tactics and by influencing use of further
lawless responses and counter-responses. As Professor Karima
Bennoune recognized, if illegal means are used in response to
terrorism, the impermissibility of terrorist means might blur and
the illegal methods of governmental response might deconstruct
the impermissibility of strategies of the terrorists as well. She
warns, therefore, that such "counterterrorism is pregnant with
future terrorists" and, hence, doomed to failure.48
As noted previously with respect to al Qaeda, being at "war"
with non-state actor terrorists is favored by elite members of al
Qaeda, since it tends to equalize their status and their violent
conduct and
they can have certain "victories" against a powerful
"enemy" while engaging in a protracted "war"
during which their status is enhanced from that of a
member of a non-state terrorist organization to that
of an "enemy combatant." Such a paradigm might
also serve al Qaeda's efforts at recruitment and
attempted justification for its "war" and terrorist

48. See Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture,26 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 1, 31 (2008)
("[T]errorism has won a great victory in the last six years, because some of the
world's leading democracies have proved willing, in the face of terrorism, to
undermine the rule of law in a manner that terrorists could never have achieved
by themselves."); Karima Bennoune, "To Respect and To Ensure": Reconciling
International Human Rights Obligations in a Time of Terror, 97 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 23, 25 (2003) (quoting W.H. Nagel, A Socio-legal View on the Suppression of
Terrorists,8 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 213, 221 (1980)); see also Bassiouni, supra note 20, at 424
("It lends credibility, if not legitimacy, to the violent acts of the anti-American
jihadists."); Michael German, Trying Enemy Combatants in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1421, 1439-40 (2007); Adam Roberts, Role of Law in the "War on

Terror": A Tragic Clash, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 18, 19-20 (2003); Lord Johan
Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 3 (2004)
("unchecked abuse of power begets ever greater abuse of power"), available at
http://www.nimj.com/documents/Guantanamo.pdf.
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tactics as means of "warfare" and, thus, contribute to
the continuation of social violence.
C. Inhibition of Prosecution
Use of unlawful interrogation tactics can inhibit prosecution of
terrorists and others who might be reasonably accused of having
violated international and U.S. domestic law. Use of some forms of
interrogation will violate U.S. constitutional strictures where the
U.S. Constitution applies 0 and can result in the exclusion of
information and physical evidence obtained from such violations in
a U.S. court or tribunal. As the district court in In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases5' recognized, "[t]he Supreme Court has long held
that due process prohibits the government's use of involuntary
statements obtained through torture or other mistreatment. " "

49.

PAUST, supra note 2, at 64; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Terrorism: The

Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 299, 303 (2004) ("By
overreacting, heightening fear levels, curtailing civil liberties, and sometimes
engaging in abuses, governments lose the high moral ground in the struggle, and
diminish their ability to engage in effective prevention and control, and,
ultimately, genuine suppression of this type of [terrorist] activity."); Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?,
43 COLUM. J. TRAINSNAT'L L. 435 (2005); Rotman, supra note 19, at 538-40
("[E]xpansion of the notion of combatancy, including its unlawful forms, favors
the terrorist self-image because it absolves them of criminal culpability. A
therapeutic jurisprudential approach to terrorism should oppose rhetoric like the
'War on Terror,' which glorifies terrorists as warriors instead of vilifying them as
criminals ... labeling terrorist attacks as ... conflicts legitimizes them and makes
attacks on military targets... appear as legitimate waging of war.... The military
response . . . is seriously counter-productive. Perpetrators become martyrs or
heroes, and military countermeasures enhance the status of terrorist groups ...
50. In view of the expectations of the Framers and the text and structure of
the U.S. Constitution, it should be recognized that the U.S. Constitution applies
wherever U.S. officials act, as a restraint on their power and authority, since they
are entirely creatures of the Constitution and have no powers outside the
Constitution. See, e.g.,
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 12, 35 n.62 (1957); United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); PAUST, supra note 2, at 75-76, 106-07, 109,
189 n.59, 227-28 n.85, 260 n.112, 279-80 nn.44-50.
51.
355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
52. Id. at 472 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964)). The
Supreme Court has condemned the totalitarian practice of using "unrestrained
power to seize persons . . . [and] hold them in secret custody, and wring from
them confessions by physical or mental torture." Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 155 (1944); see also Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); United States ex
rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (JacksonJ., dissenting) ("[i]n
the name of security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evidence
that is secret"); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) ("The rack and
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Exclusion of such information and evidence might leave
prosecutors unable to initiate prosecution or to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The same adverse consequences can result under treaty law of
the United States. For example, Article 15 of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment5 3 mandates that "[e] ach State Party shall
ensure that any statement which is established to have been made
as a result of torture shall not be involved as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence
that the statement was made. '' 54
Article 14(3) (g) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 55 also
requires that "everyone shall be entitled... [n] ot to be compelled.
• . to confess guilt." The U.N. General Assembly has also declared
that while responding to terrorism, states should "ensure that any
statement that is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement
was made.",56 The Human Rights Committee under the auspices of
the ICCPR has similarly recognized that "[i] t is important ... that
the law must prohibit the use of admissibility in judicial
proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through torture
or other prohibited treatment" addressed in Article 7 of the
ICCPR.5 7 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
also recognized that an exclusionary rule applies to material seized
during a search in violation of due process and other human
rights. 5 Within the European context, the British House of Lords
has recognized similarly that evidence obtained by torture engaged
in by a foreign government cannot be used in view of the
prohibition of torture in the European Convention on Human

torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand ....
It would be
difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense ofjustice.").
53. Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
54. Id. at art. 15.
55. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
56. G.A. Res. 61/153,
7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/153 (Feb. 14, 2007); G.A.
Res. 60/148, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/148 (Feb. 21, 2006).
57. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 20,
12 (1992), in
International Human Rights Instruments, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (Sept. 4, 1992),
at 29-32.
58. See Garcia Perez v. Peru, Case 11.006, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 1/95,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, doc. 9 rev. (1995).
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Rights and Freedoms.
During the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings, the U.S.
Military Tribunal recognized in United States v. Altstoetter (The
Justice Case), while addressing the war crime responsibility of
defendant Klemm:
it can hardly be assumed that the defendant Klemm
was unaware of the practice of the Gestapo with
regard to obtaining confessions. He had dealt with
this matter during his early period with the
department of justice. It is hardly credible that he
believed that the police methods which at an earlier
time were subject to some scrutiny by the Ministry of
Justice, had become less harsh because the Gestapo.
. . was placed beyond the jurisdiction of law.

He

must have been aware that a prolific source of clear
cases based on confessions and, therefore, legally
incontestable, came to him from the obscurity of the
torture chamber .... More specifically, Klemm knew

of abuses in concentration camps. He knew of the
practice of severe interrogations.... While he was in

the Party Chancellery he wrote the letter

. ..

denying the application of the German . . .law to

Poles, Jews, and gypsies. 60
V.

DEFLATION OF AUTHORITY, LAW, AND POWER

A program or common plan involving violations of human
rights and the laws of war in response to terrorism can deflate the
authority, influence, and general power of a government.
Degradation of a government's authority and respect can
detrimentally impact effective political and diplomatic power and
general foreign policy efforts to enhance human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law. As the U.N. General Assembly has recognized
more generally, "the respect for human rights, the respect for
democracy and the respect for the rule of law are interrelated and
Such outcomes and interrelations are
mutually reinforcing.
59.

See A (FC) & Others (FC) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2004]

UKHL 56.
60. Supra note 13, at 1093-94.
61. See supra note 43; see also Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, Preamble, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/171 (Dec. 19, 2006); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/195,
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evident with regard to the degradation of U.S. authority and
influence in the global community as a result of the shameful and
unlawful Bush program of secret detention and coercive
62
A government that systematically violates human
interrogation.
rights and law of war treaties does not serve international peace
and security founded on respect for law.
At home, the criminal program and behavior of the Bush
administration can degrade continued acceptance of traditional
American values, including human rights, democracy, respect for
63
Particularly threatening is the
the rule of law, and morality.
unacceptable claim that the President and his entourage are not
bound by any inhibiting domestic or international law and should
be free from any meaningful judicial supervision. 64 Such an
Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/195 (Dec. 20, 2004) (noting "the negative effects
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the full enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms and on the establishment of the rule of law and
democratic freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
International Covenants on Human Rights," which, of course, can include
terroristic governmental responses to non-state actor terrorism as in the case of
use of threats to kill family members, use of dogs for terroristic purposes, and use
of waterboarding during interrogation).
62. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 175,
222-23 (2006); Sadat, Nightmares, supra note 28, at 1245 (addressing loss of
respect).
63. See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Acting Out Against Terrorism, Torture, and
Other Atrocious Crimes: Contemplating Morality, Law, and History, in THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 209-10; Mora, supra note 29, at 818, 829-34; Leila
Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 135

(2004); Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., America's Anti-Torture Tradition, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2005, at B21 (noting that the Bush coercive interrogation program has "damaged
our international reputation" and "shattered one of our proudest American
traditions" of requiring humane treatment that started with George Washington,
John Adams, and others); Alberto J. Mora, An Affront to American Values, WASH.
POST, May 27, 2006, at A25; Gen. George Washington, Charge to the Northern
Expeditionary Force, Sept. 14, 1775 ("Should any American Soldier be so base and
infamous as to injure" a prisoner, the soldier should be brought to "severe and
exemplary Punishment," for by such conduct they bring "shame, disgrace and ruin
...), in GEORGE WASHINGTON, LETTERS AND
to themselves and their country.
ADDRESSES 70-71 (Jonas Viles ed., Sun Dial Classics 1909).
64. See PAUST, supra note 2, at 89-91, 242-49 nn.34-49; Michael D. Ramsey,
TorturingExecutive Power,93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1213-14 (2005); see also Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
2002),
1,
(Aug.
39
33-35,
President
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80lO2mem.pdf (reviewing laws
against torture and alleging a power of the President to conduct interrogation
activities that the laws proscribe); see generally Dawn E. Johnsen, What's a President to
Do? Interpretingthe Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 395 (2008).
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unconstitutional claim and autocratic theory must continue to be
opposed in our country and in any democracy attentive to human
rights and the rule of law. As the U.S. Supreme Court declared
during the Civil War, the suspension of law "leads directly to
anarchy or despotism" and is contrary to our Constitution; 65 and
when faced with such claims over the last several years, the
Supreme Court has consistently drawn the line in favor of the rule
of law in Hamdi, 6 Rasul,67 Hamdan,6' and Boumediene.6 9 While
dissenting in Padilla,° Justice Stevens stressed the overriding
importance of "the constraints imposed on the Executive by the
rule of law,, 7' rightly condemned torture of the mind imposed
through incommunicado detention, and offered a prescient
warning:
Whether the information so procured is more or
less reliable than that acquired by more extreme
forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this
Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by
its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to
resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.
VI. CONCLUSION

What resonates more than the details of deprivation and serial
crime is the grating, mean-spirited, and ultimately anti-American
tone of the Bush program of unlawful transfer, secret detention,
and coercive interrogation. The violations of international law that
65. SeeExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
66. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
67. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
68. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
69. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008); see Daniel Moeckli, The U.S.
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are an inherent part of the Bush program and common plan are
They degrade this country, its values, and its
unnecessary.
influence. They can fulfill terrorist ambitions and pose long-term
threats to our national security and the rule of law. Our long-term
national security can best be protected by adhering to human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law while also participating in
their greater effectuation abroad.
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